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LAW VS. PUBLIC POLICY:
A CRITICAL EXPLORATION
Theodore J. Lowit
To prepare for this keynote, I went back through some issues of the
Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy. I was delighted by the variety
of topics, the consistently high level of scholarship and, for law journals,
the lively and often sparkling use of the English language. But one ques-
tion became increasingly prominent: why the coupling of law with public
policy, especially in a law school journal? I hope that I can produce
some useful insights through my pursuit of this question as a foreigner to
the law school, just as Tocqueville, Bryce, and others brought us insights
as foreigners to the American democracy or the American
commonwealth.
Actually, no one is a foreigner to law. Law is as universal and al-
most as old as civilization itself. But where does "public policy" come
from? And when? And why? With an Italian colleague, I recently made
a survey of political science dictionaries in five countries (United States,
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) and four languages (English,
French, German and Italian). I supplemented our survey with personal
questions that I addressed, albeit unsystematically, to European, Japa-
nese, Korean, Russian and other colleagues during my several years of
service as an officer of the International Political Science Association.
From this, I discovered that "public policy" is an established concept
only in the English language. As the term became popular during the
twentieth century, and as more and more scholars were translating Amer-
ican public policy writings, French and Italian translators at first tried to
adjust with the use of mere politique and politche, or with a French ver-
sion of "politique publique." Others used multiple words and circumlo-
cutions rather than literal translation. For example, the chief of the
transition team of my 1969-79 book, The End of Liberalism,' confided
to me that he had great difficulty with "policy" and "public policy," and
said that he actually tried two or three circumlocutions before settling on
t John L. Senior Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University. Professor Lowi
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one, which I will not try here to retranslate. In recent years, most schol-
ars in non-English speaking countries simply gave up and adopted "pub-
lic policy" as an international, non-translatable concept, like
"commuter," "babysitter" and "drugstore," as Americans had done with
"coup d'etat," "d ]a mode," and (the always atrociously pronounced)
"d6ja vu."
Even in the United States, the idea of public policy is relatively
recent. Law was the word in the American founding, concerned as it was
with "a government of laws and not of men."'2 There was, of course, the
common law, whose continuation after independence was never ques-
tioned even by the most radical anti-British revolutionaries. The Consti-
tution was more modern, however, in its grounding of law in legislation.
Article I provided that "[a]ll legislative Powers ... shall be vested in...
Congress," 3 which in effect made the legislature through legislation "the
state." The all-important Section 8 of Article I went on to list the spe-
cific powers of Congress (therefore the national state) and at the end
provided that "the Congress shall have power ... [t]o make all the Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers .... ,,4 Therefore, law equals legislation. Article II rein-
forces this by providing in stark and precise terms that the president
"shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."5
Public policy had no place in any of this. Public policy did not
enter the picture at all until well into the nineteenth century and far from
law or legislation. As far as I have been able to determine, its infrequent
usage was more in the nature of a soft synonym for public opinion or
general will or consensus. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is a good case in
point. Although his great book, The Common Law,6 was published in
1881, it was the product of at least twenty years of work, and it embodied
prevailing usages despite the novelty of some of his arguments. Lecture
I of The Common Law opens with a refreshingly modern point of view,
that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." '7
Immediately, Holmes goes on to the following proposition:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do
2 See JOHN BARTLEn-, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 337 (16th ed. 1992). Bartlett credits this
quote to John Adams, 1774, and Adams credits his formulation to James Harrington in his
historic work The Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656. Id.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § I.
4 Id. at § 8.
5 Id. at art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
6 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
7 id. at I.
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than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed. 8
This point is emphasized later in the same Lecture:
In form [the growth of the law] ... is logical. The offi-
cial theory is that each new decision follows syllogisti-
cally from existing precedents .... On the other hand, in
substance the growth of the law is legislative .... The
very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from
which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of
course, considerations of what is expedient for the com-
munity concerned. Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result
of more or less definitely understood views of public pol-
icy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and
traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive prefer-
ences and inarticulate convictions, but nonetheless trace-
able to views of public policy in the last analysis. 9
Law maintained its majesty beyond 1881 with the help of early po-
litical scientists who believed there should be a strict and formal separa-
tion between "politics" and "administration." Political scientist Professor
Woodrow Wilson led this, after he returned from Germany and his doc-
toral studies imbued with the spirit that Prussia, under Frederick the
Great, had produced a governmental system in which "administration has
been most studied and most nearly perfected."' 10 Although Wilson con-
ceded that "[i]t is better to be untrained and free than to be servile and
systematic,"' "I he went on to assert that "it would be better yet to be both
free in spirit and proficient in practice."' 2 Yet how was this to be accom-
plished? Wilson insisted that we study the administrative systems of
Germany (and France) with full awareness that "we are not in search of
political principles."' 13 He then stated:
If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I
can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without bor-
rowing his probable intention to commit murder with it;
and so, if I see a monarchist ... managing a public bu-
8 Id. (emphasis added).
9 Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
1o Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. Sci. Q. 197, 204 (1887).
1 1 Id. at 207.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 220 (emphasis in original).
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reau well, I can learn his business methods without
changing one of my republican spots.
14
On this basis, he developed the ideal of the "neutral civil servant"
who could be loyal "always . . . to the interest of the public officer to
serve, not his superior alone but to the community also."' 15
It was during the next two decades that the meaning of public policy
transformed from a synonym for public opinion to a reference to state-
ments about "what the government does." Thirteen years after Woodrow
Wilson's famous article, his insistence on the distinction between politics
and administration was picked up and formalized as "two functions of
government," with politics as "policies or expressions of state will" and
administration taken as "the execution of these policies."16 This is, to the
best of my inspection, the first time when policies and politics conjoined.
In effect, "policies," defined as "expressions of state will," was essen-
tially a definition of "policy," as a description of "what legislators do,"
followed by "administration" as "what governments do." As the twenti-
eth century wore on, and governments, especially the national govern-
ment, grew larger and more highly differentiated, there were two parallel
developments of relevance: (1) the politics/administration dichotomy
was rejected in favor of a sustained political process, a "seamless web,"
with law (or policy) being made at every step of the way; and (2) the
law/policy divide was also erased, with the two, for all practical pur-
poses, becoming synonymous.
During the 1930s and beyond, in response to the dramatic growth of
government, political science began in earnest to study policy. The word
probably slipped easily into the political science vocabulary because
"law" to political scientists still tended to mean "public law," which con-
centrated most intensely upon "constitutional law" (where the main ques-
tion was whether the national or state government had the power and
authority to do what its legislation proposed). Once Congress adopted
the legislation, political scientists concentrated on how and why, which
took the form of case studies galore-detailed narratives of what came to
be called "the policy-making process."' 7 Dissertations or first articles
based on one or more case studies launched the careers of some of the
most illustrious political scientists (along with some economists and law-
yers). The following are a few examples of scholars who did their ap-
prenticeships with policy case studies: Stephen K. Bailey, James
14 id.
15 Id. at 221.
16 FRANK GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT 18
(1900).
17 Sometimes the two words are put together as policymaking, and at other times kept
completely separate as policy making.
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MacGregor Burns, Robert Cushman, Robert Dahl, Paul Douglas, E. Pen-
dleton Herring, Samuel Huntington, V.O. Key, Harold Lasswell, Grant
McConnell, E.E. Schattschneider, Phillip Selznick, Herbert Simon,
David B. Truman, Edwin Witte, and former Harvard Law Dean James
Landis.18 I must add immediately, however, that in none of these cases
was the policy's substance important. The policy (or "policy decision")
was the hook on which to hang the narrative, on the basis of which the
process, the policymaking process, would be analyzed. 19 The "seamless
web" of the policymaking process was materialized as "how a bill be-
comes a bill," "how a bill becomes a law," and "how the law (as policy)
is implemented." In fact, "implementation" became such an important
aspect of the policymaking process that it almost displaced "public ad-
ministration" as the name of that sub-discipline.
What was virtually lost in all this was the substance, even when part
of the narrative of the case study provided many of the substantive de-
tails of the policies.20 One could lament, but no one could deny, the
validity of Holmes' 1880s contention that "in substance the growth of the
law is legislative."' 2 1 One prominent voice of lament was Friedrich
Hayek who, as late as 1973, could cry out that law had once been "re-
garded as ... something to be discovered, not made," and that "the con-
ception that law could be deliberately made or altered seemed almost
sacrilegious. '22 Later in the same volume, he observed: "During the last
hundred years it has been chiefly in the service of so-called 'social' aims
that the distinction between rules of just conduct and rules for the organi-
zation of the services of government has been progressively obliter-
ated."'23 Obviously his reference to "rules of just conduct" can be
considered an intentional definition of "law."
I call up Hayek not to agree with, or apply, his appeal to return to
the mystification of law, but only to point out (and sympathize with) his
underlying argument. That somewhere during the rise of the modern lib-
eral state, law lost its autonomy and its integrity as an institution-albeit
a man-made, human-scale, fallible, changeable institution. If Hayek can
be considered the first, I have to count myself the second to insist that the
distinction between law and policy has been obliterated. But the agree-
18 For a comprehensive, but by no means exhaustive, list of policy-making studies, see
DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS 538-44 (V.0. Key, Jr. ed., 1951).
19 This emptying of substance from policy went so far that by the 1950s, the eminent
professor David Easton, in his "systems analysis" of the political process, treated policy sim-
ply as "outcomes." See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965).
20 Sometimes the substance of the statute was part of the introduction, called "the set-
ting" or the context of the narrative.
21 HOLMES, supra note 6, at 35.
22 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 83 (1973).
23 Id. at 132.
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ment or sympathy between us goes no further. Hayek has gone too far
and has become downright ideological by the suggestion that legislatures
cannot enact just rules of conduct.24 And he misrepresents and sentimen-
talizes as well as overstates the role of the common law courts, whose
rules are most often not "laid down" at all but have to be reasoned out
from the holdings of cases through the rulings and arguments of appel-
late decisions.25 Here we not only have the wisdom of Holmes, but also
of John Locke, who said, "[W]hoever has the Legislative or Supreme
Power of any Common-wealth, is bound to govern by established stand-
ing laws, promulgated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary
Decrees .... "26
This is where Locke not only has the better argument but has practi-
cality on his side, because no liberalized, secularized, de-mystified soci-
ety (except perhaps for Justice Thomas and a small cult of believers in
natural law) can ever return to a belief that the only good law is one that
was always there waiting to be discovered. The key to Locke and the
problem of law versus policy (or policy versus law, depending on the
appellant) is Locke's insistence on "established standing laws.., known
to the people, and not by extemporary decrees."2 7 In effect, I have re-
vived Hayek's very timely warning against statutes that are merely "in-
structions to administrators.
'28
Now we can turn at last to an explanation of how "public policy"
fused with "law" and became the "reference of preference." In good
lecture fashion, my argument is laid out in five points. The first point is
a reiteration of the fact that law and policy had become more or less
synonymous. Just about the time the aging Holmes was about to die, the
laws had become, as he predicted, mainly legislative, and legislation had
become, as Hayek predicted, mere "instructions to administrators. '29
This was a comfortable formulation for an increasingly behaviorist polit-
ical science as well as for an increasingly realist, behavioralist,
economistic legal scholarship. Process over substance may be a scien-
tific necessity, but is also a liberal predilection.30 (I will leave until later
another aspect of this, which is the denigration of law as an autonomous,
discrete, non-processual aspect of politics.)
24 Id at 134-35.
25 Id. at 88-91, 135.
26 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 371 (Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
27 Id.
28 See THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 144 (1969) (discussing Hayek's hypothesis).
29 See id.
30 In an early formulation, I dubbed this practice "[p]olicy without law." Id. at 126.
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The second point is that democratization favored public policy in
the choice between the two terms. In a democracy, "law" sounded too
official, unilateral, hierarchical, authoritative, and bordered on authorita-
rian. Policy appeared softer, more human, and not as divine. Public pol-
icy as an expression of public opinion in the nineteenth century seems to
have had a renaissance in the democratizing twentieth century.
Third, "law" seems not only too authoritarian for a democracy, but
also too close to permanent for a liberal state. Even though de-mystified
and no longer considered something that was forever and waiting to be
discovered, law still gave off the impression that, although a human
product, it was inaccessible once produced. In contrast, "policy," being
the product of a process, remains a continual part of the process, a never-
ending phenomenon. If the legislature is a continuing body, then its
product is legislation, and T-I-O-N is a. suffix indicating that the root
word is not fixed but is in a state of becoming. 3'
The fourth point moves the argument over into the executive
branch, where "policy" is even more at home. "Agency law making"
sounds like an accusation that the government is about to violate the
separation of powers principle. Back in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, when Congress first began delegating a considerable
degree of discretion to one agency or department after another, the sepa-
ration of powers alarm bell began to ring. For a brief moment it awak-
ened the Supreme Court, which responded approvingly that if the
legislation embodied some kind of guidelines or standards, then the
agency or department was not making law but had the authority "to fill
up the details" of the legislation. 32 Recognizing, nevertheless, that the
executive branch was in fact creating a new domain with the oxymoronic
title "administrative law," the judges and their epigone in law schools
softened it with a "quasi." Better to call this "policy," even though viola-
tions of rules set forth by, in this case, the Secretary of Agriculture in-
volved criminal offenses.
33
31 The story is told that when a person asked Gandhi, "What do you think of modern
civilization?", he answered, "I think it would be a very good idea." E.F. SCHUMACHER, GOOD
WORK 62 (1979) (quoting Ghandi). That is an example of a state of becoming!
32 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) I, 43 (1825)).
33 Id. at 514. Only once in the twentieth century did the Court turn down an important
delegation of such broad discretion to agencies and departments to make rules, and in that case
the faulty provisions in the statute were so incredibly broad that Congress actually labeled
them "Declaration of Policy," in which the only guidelines were that the purpose of the rules
the new agency (the National Recovery Administration) had authority to make would-be rules
"to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce" and to promote
"the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups," by
approving "codes of fair competition" by trade associations. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 416-17 (1935); Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 534-35 (1935).
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Fifth and finally, policy has been attractive because it holds out
hope that government will be more participatory, not only at election
time and not only in Congress where only the wealthy and the organized
participate, but all along the line. Policy satisfies the need to eliminate
the formality of government, as implied by the hope of making govern-
ment "closer to the people." Americans have always put a lot of stock in
not being fooled or put off by the formal, seeking to pierce through to the
informal, the real-as in being able to bargain with power before power
is applied. Law is formal; policy is real. The ultimate expression of this
comes out in an apocryphal story about President Grover Cleveland who
refused to support the bill of a certain lobbyist on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional. 34 To this refusal the lobbyist replied, "What's the Con-
stitution between friends?"
35
All of this is true and has been widely endorsed, especially by
moderates of all ideological and partisan persuasions. I accept this fact,
but I am drawn passionately to the opposite conclusion, that policy, as
understood within all five rubrics, is a danger, not a boon. Tocqueville
put the case too well for me to offer my own formulation:
Men living in democratic ages do not readily compre-
hend the utility of forms. . . . Forms excite their con-
tempt and often their hatred; as they commonly aspire to
none but easy and present gratifications, they rush on-
wards to the object of their desires, and the slightest de-
lay exasperates them. This same temper [carries] with
them into political life....
Yet this objection which the men of democracies make
to forms is the very thing which renders form so useful
to freedom; for their chief merit is to serve as a barrier
between the strong and weak, the ruler and the people, to
retard the one, and give the other time to look about him.
Forms become more necessary in proportion as the gov-
ernment becomes more active and more powerful ...
Thus democratic nations naturally stand more in need of
forms than other nations .... 36
34 Louis FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS V (1978). Although Fisher's
footnote attributes this anecdote to President Theodore Roosevelt, notwithstanding that it is
most often attributed to President Cleveland, other sources attribute it to an exchange between
President Cleveland and Timothy J. Campbell, a member of the House of Representatives.
Eg., BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 539. See also THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 307 (Burton
Stevenson, ed., 10th ed. 1967) (attributing the quote to an exchange between Cleveland and
Campbell).
35 FISHER, supra note 34.
36 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 346 (Henry Reeve, trans., Arling-
ton House 1966) (1840).
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This permits me to conclude with dispatch. There will always be
some degree of distance between the formal and the real-in bureaucra-
cies public and private, in families and all other forms of contractual
obligations, in sports and other contests, including elections, and all as-
pects of governing. But in all those matters, most of all in democratic
governments, the distance between the formal and the real can be taken
as an operational definition of illegitimacy. Policy is the informal side of
government, the real statement of what government actually does. But
policy should be tolerated, not embraced, and even so, tolerated only as
long as it knows its place: as the servant of the formal rule of law.

